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for Values and Transparency
 
Didier Reynders
European Commissioner for Justice
 
Dear Honourable Members of the European Commission,
We, the undersigned, call on the Commission to take further immediate steps to
contain and censure the continuing lawlessness in Poland under the Law and Justice
(PiS) government. The disbursement of EU funds is now linked to compliance with
the rule of law, and President Von der Leyen has pledged to use the rule of law
tool from Jan 1st onwards. PiS’s persecution of independent judges has occurred
as recently as in Dec.-Jan. 2020/2021. This affront to the rule of law demands the
Commission’s attention and action.   
Judges who have examined cases related to the reinstatement of Prosecutor
Mariusz Kraso# have been and are being persecuted for their purely judicial actions.
Kraso# called attention to the politicization of the prosecutor’s office in a May 2019
resolution adopted by the Assembly of Prosecutors of the Regional Prosecutor’s
Office in Cracow. As a result he was demoted, harassed, and his workplace was
moved around 300 km from his residence. Over the last two months, the Internal
Affairs Department of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office has summoned as
witnesses 14 judges from five different benches of Cracow’s district, regional and
appellate courts. The judges now face potential criminal charges of failure to fulfil
obligations as public officials, punishable by up to three years of imprisonment (Art.
231(1) of the Penal Code). Their purported crime? Failing to persecute Prosecutor
Kraso#. 
This is an unparalleled attempt to put pressure on independent judges by the
politicized prosecution service. Note the following alarming facts:
- 1 -
• Judge of the Regional Court for Cracow and judge-rapporteur in the main case,
Jaros#aw #ukasik, has also been summoned even though the case was still
ongoing and was ripe for judgment;
• On Nov. 20th, 2020, judge #ukasik set the date for the next hearing in
Prosecutor Kraso#’s case for Dec. 22nd. With preliminary issues settled,
in all probability, on the Dec. 22nd hearing, judge #ukasik was to issue the
final verdict, which was likely to be unfavorable to the politicized prosecutor’s
department (as indicated by, i.a., the interim measure of reinstating Prosecutor
Kraso# to his workplace in Cracow with immediate effect ordered earlier by this
judge);
• On Nov. 27th, the prosecutor’s office was notified via postal service of the
date of the next hearing which was set for Dec. 22nd. On Dec. 11th the judge-
rapporteur in the main case and almost all judges who adjudicated in the related
proceedings were sent summons for questioning (scheduled for Dec. 29th, Jan.
12th, and Jan. 13th). The summons were purposely sent so the judges would
receive them before the final hearing in the main case (Dec. 22nd), as was the
case with the majority of judges;
• Although the investigation has been ongoing for over a year, no one was
summoned until Judge #ukasik set the date for the final hearing, a hearing
where a decision unfavorable to the prosecutor’s office could be passed. The
purpose of the summons was to intimidate Judge-Rapporteur #ukasik before he
could deliver the judgement; 
• Under Article 232(1) of the Polish Penal Code (influencing official activities of
the court with unlawful threats), the summoning of the judges for questioning
can constitute a crime (as described in more detail in the attached ‘Themis’
resolution);
• Moreover, throughout Prosecutor Kraso#’s case, earlier judges examining the
case  received “subtle” warnings from the prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor’s
office sent requests for borrowing files, which indicated that an investigation
under Art. 231 of the Penal Code was underway. Nevertheless, the judges
consistently issued judgments in favor of Prosecutor Kraso#. The prosecutor’s
office feared they would lose the case at the Dec. 22nd final trial and thus
further tightened the screws on judicial discretion. 
These actions violate the principle of the independence of judges and non-
interference in the exercise of judicial power. As stated by the Commissioner for
Human Rights, Adam Bodnar, the actions of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office
may interfere with the exercise of independent judicial power by causing judges
to fear negative consequences for resolving cases in accordance with their own
convictions and knowledge. Judicial independence is an indispensable element of
the full implementation of the right to a court referred to in Art. 45(1) of the Polish
Constitution, Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 47 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Art. 19 paragraph 1 (2)
TEU.
To put it bluntly, these judges are being coerced to make decisions in accordance
with politicians’ wishes by threats of imprisonment and other criminal punishment.
Politicized coercion in the administration of justice is unthinkable in a Member
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State of the European Union, but Polish authorities have shrugged off repeated
EU warnings. Thus, in the light of the Dec. 16th, 2020 speech by President von
der Leyen–where she announced that the new conditionality mechanism should be
applied from Jan. 1st, 2021 and cover all breaches from that day onwards–we urge
the Commission to commence the necessary monitoring of the unlawful pressure
exerted upon independent Cracow judges without undue delay. 
 
Your’s Faithfully, 
The Open Dialogue Foundation & Themis Association of Judges (Poland)
 
With:
Alberto Alemanno, The Good Lobby
Dr. Petra Bárd, Central European University
Prof. Gábor Halmai, European University Institute
Prof. Bojan Bugaric, Sheffield University
Prof. Grainne de Burca, New York University
Prof. Paul Craig, St John’s College, Oxford
Dr. Patrycja D#browska-K#osi#ska, Queen’s University Belfast & Warsaw University
of Technology
Forum for Cooperation of Judges (FWS, Poland)
Prof. Kees Groenendijk, Radboud University Nijmegen
Dr. Joelle Grogan, Middlesex University London
Dr. Maarten Hillebrandt, University of Helsinki
Prof. R. Daniel Kelemen, Rutgers University 
Dr. Kriszta Kovács, WZB Center for Global Constitutionalism
Prof. Martin Krygier, University of New South Wales, Sydney
Prof. Imelda Maher, University College Dublin
Dr. Amrei Müller, University College Dublin 
Lex Super Omnia Association of Prosecutors (LSO, Poland)
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Prof. Bart#omiej Nowotarski, Economic University of Wroclaw
Election Observatory (Obserwatorium Wyborcze, Poland)
Dr. Sejal Parmar, University of Sheffield 
Prof. Laurent Pech, Middlesex University London
Prof. Vlad Perju, Boston College Law School & Clough Center for the Study of
Constitutional Democracy 
Prof. Sébastien Platon, University of Bordeaux
Association of Family Judges “Pro Familia” (Poland)
Prof. Micha# Romanowski, University of Warsaw
Marek Tata#a, Civil Development Forum (FOR, Poland)
Prof em., Theo de Roos, Tilburg University
Prof. Wojciech Sadurski, University of Sydney and University of Warsaw
Antonio Stango, Italian Federation for Human Rights (Italy)
Alice Stollmeyer, Defend Democracy (Belgium)
Prof. Adrienne Stone, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne 
Dr. Liam Thornton, School of Law, University College Dublin
Prof. Fryderyk Zoll, Jagiellonian University
The Arrested Lawyers Initiative
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